Language switcher

English EN Italiano IT
Italiano

Category: Blog

Europe on the Move

Posted on by claudia

By Alfredo De Feo

When you live a normal life, made up of daily worries, children, health, the need to solve the inevitable problems, small and large, it is difficult to focus, on what is happening in the world, the geopolitical strategies, the risks for our economy and therefore for our lifestyle and our well-being, for the future of our children. It’s difficult to focus but we must.

For many decades, coexistence among countries has been based on a series of basic principles: respect for democracy and the autonomy of the various countries, respect for international rules, the non-use of force to resolve tensions, the promotion of an increasingly free world trade without customs barriers that would increase the well-being of citizens in a generalized way. All guaranteed by a series of international organizations

Like it or not, the war unleashed by Russia against Ukraine in February 2022 triggered a turning point in the balance of the world. Tensions in the Middle East, on Europe’s southern border, have aggravated the situation.

The inauguration of Donald Trump to the White House in January 2025 has brought a further shake up to the world balance, with a strong impact on Europe and its states. I do not need to enumerate the proclamations and counter-proclamations of President Trump and his inner circle. European governments must face challenges and make difficult decisions, knowing how to look at the medium to long term, rather than immediate polls and have the ability to explain to citizens the meaning of choices that may appear unpopular in the short term.

The unanimous mandate given by the states and the majority of the European Parliament is a first sign that Europe is ready to stand together and start creating synergies in the field of defence. The other positive aspect, which transpires from the White Paper, is that Member States will start to build something, with the aim of better coordinating the production and purchasing war material, developing and sharing information of national intelligence services. The same goes for technology, communications and so on.

A large part of these initiatives, which will only become clearer when the proposals are presented, will probably be financed with common debt guaranteed by all states. Following the example of what has been done with the Next Generation EU. This plan, favored by the relaxation of the rules of the Stability Pact, should eventually allow European states to be more autonomous in the defense of their territory and their values, a first response to the American disengagement from the defense of Europe.

I addition, it is worth mentioning the turning point taking place in Germany where, under the leadership of the future chancellor, Friederich Merz, a constitutional reform has been voted to abolish the spending limit to finance expenses related to infrastructure, the environment and defense: a real revolution.

The second emergency is international trade. President Trump has begun to introduce tariffs on many imported goods, giving rise to retaliation by the affected countries, creating a strong impoverishment of their economy (European and non-European). It is difficult to say at this stage whether these tariffs are the final goal of the American President or just a negotiating strategy, but in either case these attitudes require equally strong positions on the European side. On the other hand, strong and decisive positions will facilitate negotiatiations.

It is difficult to say whether European leaders will be able to show solidarity with each other in the interest of defending national and European sovereignty. It is a great opportunity but it is not certain that everyone knows how to seize it. On the other hand, it should be remembered that the European Treaties provide for the possibility of carrying out actions with the so-called “enhanced cooperation” (with the participation of

at least nine states) or ultimately, through agreements among states, outside the legal framework of the European Union, which France and England are doing to guarantee support for Ukraine (the coalition of the willing).

To conclude, public opinion should be aware that the challenges we face do not concern others but ourselves, our freedom, our values. We do not want to leave our children the choice of whether to live under American, Chinese or Russian rules but to be proud to remain European with our national identities. The Erasmus generation is already a step ahead and this can be seen as a sign of great optimism.

Published in the Gazzetta di Parma 18 March 2025

The Reasons for ReArm Europe

Posted on by claudia

By Marzo Ziliotti

On March 6, twenty-six EU heads of state and the EU government, overcoming (finally!) the unanimity rule, approved the plan called ReArm Europe. Divided in five points, it establishes a common European financial instrument, which will provide 150 billion euros to member states for defense investment; it introduces a derogation (escape clause) to the parameters of the Stability and Growth Pact, which opens fiscal space to individual states for defense spending of an additional 650 billion euros; and it promotes the mobilization of private capital, through the European Investment Bank, in order to stimulate large European savings for the financing of domestic defense firms.

Thus, an 800 billion euro package of public resources alone, in addition to private resources, which, on the one hand, (with the 650 billion euro waiver effectively) sends the constraints of the newly created Stability and Growth Pact into the attic; and on the other hand, (with the 150 billion euro European fund) takes the first step toward the establishment of a true common defense system, necessarily financed by common resources.

The project, by its scale and especially by the nature of its objectives, can clearly be called historic in scope. But it is equally evident that “ReArm,” moreover “at home,” is a word that should arouse no one’s enthusiasm. Well understandable, then, that the initiative has provoked heated debate, not only in the halls of professional politics, but also among the public and in the very consciences of citizens. This is positive, wanting strongly to continue to believe that free dialectical confrontation between ideas is the most precious value of our liberal democracies.

But, at such an objectively complex hairpin turn in History, it is essential to be clear about some crucial contextual elements. The first fact is the very rapid and relevant increase in geopolitical risks for European countries. Mind you: this is not to evoke scenarios with the Cossack cavalry in St. Peter’s Square; but the disturbing crescendo of the use of force against Europe by Putin’s Russia is undeniable: the outright military violence, mobilizing all available human and economic resources, in Ukraine. But also violence in the insidious form of hybrid warfare: continuous cyber-attacks, increasingly aggressive and widespread, on the computer systems mainly of public entities; increasingly pervasive interference in public opinion, especially at election time, with massive and scientific dissemination of fake news and through support – more or less covered – for openly anti-European, when not explicitly pro-Russian, political formations and parties. Restoring historic Russian influence with a perimeter similar to that of the U.S.S.R. days is a stated goal; and it is certainly not comforting that, as Kremlin spokesman Dimitry Peskov stated a few days ago, “the new U.S. administration’s vision regarding foreign policy configurations largely coincides with our vision.”

Second point: the above poses an urgent problem of deterrence. Urgent: it would certainly be better to start first with the establishment of a single European defense system and only then proceed to rearmament. But there is no time. Making the Euro took at least ten years (from the European Monetary System crisis to January 1, 2002, when the single currency began to physically circulate). The European Army needs a long process of construction, which is inextricably linked to the building of a common political house. Deterrence, which does not at all mean a bellicose will, but, exactly the opposite, i.e. the strengthening of negotiating power. This is the only way to make realistic – and not just a vacuous invocation – the prospect of diplomatic solutions on the most lasting and least unfair basis possible.

The third aspect, perhaps the most delicate one: the oft-cited alternative claim of spending on butter instead of guns. Who, a priori, would not prefer government spending to favor schools and hospitals over military purposes? But, put in decontextualized terms, the question once again risks being dangerously – or, worse, guiltily – misleading. First, it should be remembered, because spending on defensive systems nowadays does not so much consist of bombs and guns, but predominantly of research and development of advanced technologies (cybersecurity, intelligence), with proven positive externalities in terms of innovations that can be widely used in the civilian sphere (think, just to cite two possible examples, of drones and cybersecurity systems). Not only that, but the substantial amount (800 billion euros) of resources mobilized can enable massive reconversion operations of industrial sectors in crisis (automotive, for example), generating employment support and multiplicative economic effects (in the past, multipliers of military spending -especially when directed to innovative technologies – have been calculated as high as 1.5: spending 1 euro generates an increase in GDP of 1.5 euros, i.e., it creates an income that exceeds the self-financing of the spending itself by 50 percent).

But even before the claim – unsightly as much as you like, but true – that investment in defense systems can be an effective driver of employment and economic growth, the dreaded conflict between military spending and social welfare starts from a basic misunderstanding. Security – guaranteed precisely by defense systems – is an indispensable prerequisite with respect to every other constituent element of collective welfare. Any right (to education, to health, to work) necessarily rests on the subsistence of the most fundamental right there is: the security of the physical integrity of the person and his property (material and immaterial).

Therefore, just as we are all fully aware that, in order to guarantee this right to security with respect to “internal” dangers, it is indispensable to allocate adequate resources for the funding of the appropriate law enforcement agencies (Police, Carabinieri, etc.), it is necessary to regain an equal awareness – clouded for a long time by the illusion of an eternal and gratuitous American umbrella – that the armed forces (Army, Air Force, Navy) are likewise indispensable to protect exactly the same right with respect to “external” risks.

To those who invoke the ideal of a “neutral Europe,” it would be salutary to remind them that the neutral country par excellence, Switzerland, has based its vocation for neutrality (in addition to a geographic location that has never interested anyone and a banking secrecy that has suited everyone) on an ancient warrior skill – not coincidentally, the popes for more than five hundred years have chosen the Swiss Guards to defend the Vatican – and on a universal conscription obligation in which, after one’s first service under arms, for ten years one is required to return to the barracks for periodic repetition courses.

Adequate defense capability represents the insurance policy placed to guarantee peace, a supremely valuable commodity; and, as is the case with all insurance, one pays the premium precisely with the intention of never having to use it.

Published on Gazzetta di Parma on march, 11th 2025

Automatic translation edited by Edward Lynch

The American Administration and European Sovereignty

Posted on by claudia

Alfredo De Feo

There are dates in history that have an impact on citizens and public opinion. For example, how can we forget March 2020, when almost simultaneously the world stopped due to a pandemic that reminded the whole world of the fragility of human beings especially in a globalized world; or February 22, 2022, when the aggression against Ukraine by Russia broke a balance of peace putting an end to some basic principles of international law such as respect for the sovereignty of a State with the concrete risk not only of extension of the conflict but also the risk of violations of national sovereignty, through military actions or sophisticated cyber interference. Or again October 7, 2023 when the brutal attacks by Hamas against the Israeli people reopened the never-ending Israel-Palestinian conflict, with its burden of massacres and tensions and the risk of destabilizing the entire region with human and economic consequences that are difficult to calculate.

 

January 20, 2025 could become a date that will be remembered in the history of European countries. The entrance into the White House of the newly re-elected President Trump risks in fact to the life of us Europeans. Obviously we do not know if and how the electoral proclamations will translate into concrete actions and policies, but even admitting that much evidence does not make proof, there are enough reasons to be concerned. I will limit myself to pointing out three concrete threats to which European countries must be ready to give effective responses.  These threats are: 1) the introduction of duties on European products, 2) global deregulation from the use/abuse of artificial intelligence, social media and customs clearance of cryptocurrencies and 3) the American military disengagement from Europe.

 

The issue of duties is what could tempt European states to go and negotiate bilaterally with the American administration. A separate negotiation of the individual states would allow them to extract some concessions but the price to pay would be high both in terms of imports and in increasing American influence on national policies in the various countries. European states should defend their sovereignty by trying to prepare a common response to American initiatives, trying to avoid a trade war, harmful for all, and trying to establish a negotiation to reach a global trade agreement, which can only be achieved with the ability to find objectives shared by all states.

In the technology sector, Europe has a large production delay but has been at the forefront in regulating the use of artificial intelligence (AI act) to allow responsible use for the benefit of consumers and for the defence of copyright. At the same time, measures have been adopted to regulate Digital services and the Digital Market. These measures are aimed at limiting the excessive power of digital platforms, such as Amazon, Facebook, TikTok, Google and others. To this must be added the probable pressure exerted by Trump’s powerful advisor, Elon Musk, to formalize and liberalize the market of cryptocurrencies (he is also the owner of one of these). European states have every interest in regulating the sectors of services and the digital market and cryptocurrencies, so as not to be caught unprepared and resist the probable deregulation pressures that will likely come from the new American administration. Only with a strong position will European states be able to protect their citizens and maintain their national sovereignty.

Finally, the problem of security and protection of the European territory from external attacks. The protection guaranteed so far by the American shield within NATO risks disappearing. The United States has long been asking for a greater financial commitment for defence within NATO, requests that have only found a distracted ear from most European governments. The new American administration risks not making any concessions and forcing European states to increase defence spending.

This poses three types of problems: financial, productive and military. The public finances of almost all states do not have, individually, the resources to sustain expenses, which would also raise strong criticism and resistance from public opinion. The solution could be found, on the model put in place in the post Covid period, in the issuance of common European debt to finance a greater European presence in its military defence.

The second problem is of a productive nature: if the European states do not want to continue financing the American arms industries, they must agree to direct production and towards a reduced number of weapon models, and renouncing their claim to national excellence. This is not easy but essential to invest in European industry as recommended in Enrico Letta’s report.

Finally, the military aspect: the simple coordination of initiatives is not enough. A qualitative leap is necessary, creating decision-making structures capable of taking measures to guarantee the security of our countries and the sovereignty of our States.

If Europe will positively take up the challenges that will come from the United States, the date of January 20, 2025 could be remembered as that of the qualitative leap of Europe, otherwise … better not think about it!  

English version edited by Edward Lynch

Published by the Gazzetta di Parma 11/01/2025

Towards the digital euro: what is it and what will it be used for?

Posted on by claudia

Marco Ziliotti

Imagine being able to have a virtual purse, embedded in your smartphone – or computer – or in a card, allowing you to make payments accepted anywhere, without commissions or other costs (neither for you nor for the recipient); which would work even offline, in the most remote mountain retreat or when the internet goes down; which would allow, again without cost, to transfer purchasing power in real time to a family member whose wallet has been stolen while travelling abroad; which, unlike credit transfers, credit and debit cards, is not only, as mentioned above, free of charge, but does not even require a bank account; which, however, if you already have one, can allow you (via a so-called reverse waterfall mechanism) to draw on your existing funds; in short, a means of payment as simple and universal as cash, but which, unlike cash, thanks to its immateriality, can be used without physical transfer and held minimising the risks of fraudulent misappropriation.

In fact, there have been digital wallet systems on the market for years (including the most popular apps PayPal, Google Pay, Apple Pay, Amazon Pay), but first of all, their functioning depends on internet coverage and, moreover, they are instruments managed by private entities, mainly from across the Atlantic, which, among other things, take possession of all the information relating to the transactions carried out.

The digital euro, on the other hand, in the same way as the physical euro, will be a means of payment managed by an authoritative public institution, the ECB, with all the necessary guarantees (including that of having a ‘domestic’ manager, a non-trivial element in times of great geopolitical uncertainty). The legislative project for the establishment of a European CBDC (Central Bank Digital Currency) – similar projects in the US and China are, moreover, at an advanced stage – is contained in the ‘Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the establishment of the digital euro’, which, after a preparatory phase that began in November 2023, envisages that in a year’s time the Governing Council of the ECB will move on to the operational phase, establishing the detailed methods and timing (rulebook).

The diffusion of the virtual European currency will therefore probably begin in 2026, with the obligation to accept it as a means of payment not only in the twenty countries of the Eurozone, but in all twenty-seven of the EU, with the well-founded expectation that in a short time, in the same way as the physical euro, the digital euro will also be accepted in all – or almost all – countries of the world.

The precise aim of the European authorities is that the digital euro should only be a means of payment and not a reserve of value (i.e. an asset in which to invest one’s wealth). To this end, it is envisaged that sums held in digital euros will not bear any interest and will be subject to strict quantitative limits at the individual level (businesses will only be able to receive it in payment). These constraints will also serve to avoid disintermediation effects and thus displacement of the banking system: bank deposits will continue to be the typical form of reserves of liquid assets.

This nature as a mere means of payment, and not as a potential speculative asset, also highlights how the digital euro is in no way comparable to cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin, Ethereum, Tether, Solana, etc.): these in fact, as is well known, have no guarantee of legal control, but rather systems based on distributed technologies, such as blockchain, and are typically used as forms of speculative investment, which are highly volatile.

The digital euro, on the other hand, will be subject to precise controls by the ECB, which, in accordance with its precise institutional mandate, will therefore have to guarantee its security – first and foremost against cybercrime -, the stability of its value and, no less important, the protection of privacy. The latter is a particularly sensitive issue: the frequent use of cryptocurrencies for illicit purposes suggests that digital currencies, like cash, may also be used for illegal purposes. It will be up to the intelligence of the regulator to find the right balance between fighting financial crime and economic freedom.

Translated with deepl edited by Edward Lynch

The future European Commission

Posted on by claudia

Alfredo De Feo

On 20 November 2024, the political groups in the European Parliament concluded a political agreement which, with reasonable certainty, will allow the new European Commission to take office, as last term,  on 1 December. This vote puts an end to many months in which the European institutions’ attitudes has looked more inward than geopolitical. The election of Trump to the Presidency of the United States has given an acceleration to processes that in the past have been more complex.

For many observers, the behaviour of the leaders of the parliamentary groups appeared to be immature, dictated by concerns that are difficult to understand in the face of global urgencies and challenges, challenges that can only be faced with great unity.

The contrasts between the political groups, beyond identity and national positions, concealed a basic malaise: accepting the shift of the majority from the Europeanism we have known in decades to positions of a Europeanism, marked by a more invasive presence of the States, This new tendency is probably more in tune with the sentiments of a part of public opinion,  which translated into the result in the European elections.

Ursula von der Leyen, immediately grasped this change, proposing to involve the conservative group, or at least part of the group, in the top positions of the Commission, being aware that in the next five years it will not always be able to count on the majority of the People’s Party, Socialists, Liberals and probably Greens but that, probably, she will also need the support of the more moderate right European conservatives. In addition, the appointment of a Vice-President of the Commission issue of the Conservatives should guarantee a more stable majority in the Council, where Italy’s weight is not indifferent. In fact, in the bicameral European architecture, the Commission, for any legislative act, will have to find the support not only of the parliamentary majority but also that of the Member States. The attitude of the President of the Commission denotes lucidity and political realism.

The European Parliament has largely demonstrated in recent years its central role in the institutional balance, it will be able to continue to be central provided that it maintains the ability to compromise even in the face of a Council, whose majority of States probably have a more national vision of Europe.

On the other hand, if we look at the last twenty years, the European decision-making process has become progressively more intergovernmental, reducing the influence of the Commission. The Commission that will have to accompany Europe towards 2030 will certainly be influenced by governments, many of the Commissioners are direct expressions of national governments and it is likely that these will condition the Commission’s choices more than in the past.

However, recent years have shown that the process of European integration can also continue through the intergovernmental method, with decisions taken unanimously, as for instance the Recovery and Resilience Plan financed with the guarantee of the national budgets. Although this type of funding is unlikely to be replicated in the short term, Member States may follow the same method to progress in the European integration. The concrete proof appeared at the informal European Council on 8 November 2024, where the Heads of State and Government invited the Commission to present a horizontal strategy on the deepening of the single market, towards a union of savings and investment and to make urgent progress on the capital markets union.

 

In addition, States ask to the High Representative and the Commission to present proposals to increase the efficiency of the European defence capability, in particular by appropriately strengthening the defence technological and industrial base.

To conclude, the new Commission will have to strengthen European credibility with proposals that can garner the consensus of all the States if possible, without forgetting that the Treaties provide that some projects can be shared only by a group of States, through the enhanced cooperation as for the Euro, or the Schengen Treaty, , obviously leaving the doors open to others to participate. 

 

Pubblicato sulla Gazzetta di Parma 23/11/2024

The Single Market and the English Lesson

Posted on by claudia

Alfredo De Feo, Scientific Director of the european college of Parma foundation

For more than four years the United Kingdom has formally left the European Union, and by now everyone recognises that the balance sheet of the divorce is heavily negative. According to figures presented by the UK Budget Office, none of the promises of the referendum promoters have been fulfilled: savings in contributions to the EU, less tax plus trade and fewer migrants. The UK continues to pay its debts to Europe (32 billion), has increased immigration from non-EU countries as a result of the departure of much European labour, putting essential services such as hospitals into crisis, trade with non-EU countries has not lived up to expectations, and the reintroduction of borders has led to the recruitment of a hundred thousand additional civil servants, which has increased public expenditure.

For example, from 2009 to 2016, Europe invested over €6 billion per year in the UK, between the European budget and the European Investment Bank, compared to the €2.4 billion made available by the government in recent years (EIB and UK budget office data, reported by Corriere della sera on 1 July). All this explains why the UK, and its citizens, have become impoverished in the last four years.

The British lesson should induce the European ruling class and public opinion to reflect on the benefits that the intuitions of Delors, Mitterand and Kohl to create the Single Market for people, goods, services and capital brought to Europe. A single market that has been imperfectly realised.

The European Parliament has published a mapping of the cost of non-Europe, i.e. the benefits that a completion of the European market would bring to the economies of member states. The study concludes that a deepening of European integration could increase European GDP by more than €2.8 trillion by 2032.

Awareness of this untapped potential led the European Council to request the preparation of a report on the future of the internal market, a report whose drafting was entrusted to Enrico Letta, former Italian Prime Minister and President of the Delors Institute and Rector of one of Europe’s most prestigious business schools in Madrid.

The report, Much more than a market, defines the context in which European leaders will have to confront themselves, identifying three key factors that must guide the deepening of the EU’s internal market: 1) the commitment to an ecological and digital transition that is economically and socially sustainable; 2) the inescapable prospect of European enlargement; and 3) the need to strengthen the coordination of EU defence policies, a policy that cannot be delegated to our NATO partners.

The Report, submitted to the European Council in April 2024, reviews the areas where the internal market needs to be completed or renewed in order to unleash new potential for the single market, presenting a series of concrete proposals ultimately aimed at improving the lives of citizens and economic operators.

These proposals include the extension of the single market to innovation, research and education, and the creation of a European company law, complementary to national laws with the aim of helping businesses, especially small and medium-sized ones, operating or wishing to exploit European markets.

Some of these proposals were taken up by the next President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leynen, in her investiture speech before the European Parliament and included in the mandate given to individual commissioners. It is therefore to be hoped that the proposals contained in the report will become part of the European political agenda in the coming months. 

In conclusion, the Letta report achieves two objectives: the first is to put the importance of the single market back on the table of European leaders and in front of public opinion, also on the strength of the negative British experience; the second is to contribute to the European political agenda of the coming months.

European policy also needs ambitious goals to regain the trust of public opinion, while being aware of a complex framework: a new Commission, a European Parliament strongly influenced by nationalist tendencies, and an international context dominated by crises that are difficult to solve, such as the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, the continuous migratory flows, but also climate change and the satisfaction of energy needs.

European public opinion needs to rediscover an ideal drive as Delors was able to do in the mid-1980s by launching the single market programme. Free movement in Europe is not just an economic factor but serves to revive and strengthen the sense of belonging of European citizens, as the title of the report says much more than a market, it represents an opportunity for European leaders, which we hope they will not miss.

Traduzione automatica rivista da Edward Lynch

Where does european economic integration stand?

Posted on by claudia

Marco Ziliotti, Administrative Director of the european college of Parma Foundation

For more than thirty years – more than a generation ago,  – in a prevailing area of the European continent, which has in the meantime expanded from twelve to twenty-seven states.

People (Schengen Treaty, 19 June 1990), financial capitals (EEC Directive of 1 July 1990) and goods (European Single Market, 1 January 1993) have circulated without borders. For more than twenty years, payments in twenty of these countries have been settled with a common currency, the Euro.

The economic, social, political and cultural effects of the European integration project (a unique experiment in history, because it was not imposed by a hegemonic state, but by the voluntary cooperation of all the member states) have been, and are, undeniably profound, pervasive and to a large extent irreversible. But the road ahead for Europe, if only from an economic point of view, to truly become a common home, capable of fully exploiting its extraordinary potential, is by no means finished.

As far as the movement of goods is concerned, despite the fact that the single market and the single currency have enormously strengthened the supply chains on a continental, to date the total value of intra-EU trade in goods accounts for little more than a quarter of the total value produced; on the other hand, this interchange is worth 60% among the United States of America,.

In Europe, language barriers, the heterogeneity of the legal value of educational and professional qualifications, and the lack of integration between different pension systems still represent serious obstacles to labour mobility. Although an increasing number of young people, choose to – or are forced to seek job opportunities abroad, on average only three out of every hundred Europeans live and work permanently in a Member State other than their country of birth; in the USA, one in four.

Integration with regard to trade in services is still largely unfinished: for instance, the telecommunication and energy sectors have remained, from the outset, outside the Single Market. Partly as a result of this (as strongly highlighted in Mario Draghi’s recent speech at La Hulpe), the failure of European utilities to exploit economies of scale and the poor interconnection between national networks make the bills of European businesses and households much higher than those of the United States, and not only there.

But the most striking example of potential European competitive advantages that remains unexploited due to persistent fragmentation of rules and institutions is the capital market. On the one hand, the historical capacity of private savings, of households in particular, which in Europe remains at a level more than double than that of American households (the saving rates on disposable income in the EU varies between the member states from 10 to 15 per cent; in the United States, recent historical series show it at between 3 and 5 per cent – except for the peak of ‘forced savings’ during the pandemic). Yet 250 billion euros of financial flows leave Europe every year.

The capitalisation of European stock exchanges remains a sub-multiple not only of the American ones (Nyse and Nasdaq), but also of the Asian ones (Tokyo, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Singapore). The reason is obvious: when an Italian company is listed in Milan, it is in fact accessing predominantly domestic savings (stock market capitalisation of the Piazza Affari stock exchange: 800 billion euros; stock market capitalisation – ‘market cap’ – of the Nyse on Wall Street: 25 billion dollars, of which almost one third are non-American companies).

Once again, the key word in the problem is integration: it is very true that a German saver can buy shares in Italy and vice versa, but this remains a ‘foreign investment’. The Italian and German capital markets are controlled by different supervisory authorities (Consob and BaFin; the European authority ESMA has only coordinating powers); the rules governing the operation of German and Italian companies (company law; crisis and insolvency codes) remain distinct; just as the taxation on business income produced in Italy or Germany, or any other European state, is different, with a variability across Europe – from 9% in Hungary and 12% in Ireland, to 35% in Malta – that is unparalleled among the various US states (with a minimum tax rate of 21% and a maximum of 30%).

Despite the extraordinary progress made, given its democratic rules of governance, Europe is still in limbo. In today’s competitive and geopolitical environment, returning to its original values would be disastrous for its individual member states. All that remains is to move forward, with the utmost determination and with the awareness that the “particular” disadvantages of integration are far outweighed by the advantages of general interest.    

Which majority to appoint the President of the European Council?

Posted on by claudia

José Luis Pacheco 

It may not be very important, but it is telling about the lack of knowledge of European affairs by the media sphere (and consequently public opinion). 

 Many papers, including some commonly considered as a reference have noticed that the election of the President of the European Council is made by this body deciding by qualified majority. The same applies to the nomination of the candidate for President of the Commission and with the election of the High Representative Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.   So far so good. But then they add that this means the favorable vote of 55% of the member states, corresponding at least to 65% of the population of the Union. This amounts to 15 Member States (without taking into consideration the population factor). 

It is wrong!  

That is the qualified majority required when the Council or the European Council decide on the basis of a proposal from the Commission. But in this case there is no proposal from the Commission. It is member states themselves who propose names to the nominations. In such cases, when the decision is not taken on the basis of a proposal from the Commission, the qualified majority requires the favorable vote of 72% of the member states, representing at least 65% of the population of the Union. This means 20 member states (quite a difference as compared to 15). It results from art. 15(6) TUE and from article 235(1) TFEU, which calls for the application of art. 16(4) TUE and 238(2) TFEU to the decision-making procedure in the European Council. 

It is bad enough when such mistakes can be read in prestigious papers. But it is much worse when the error can be found on the site of the European Commission itself, which serves as guide for most of the press and for citizens.

The Political Agenda (Yet to Be Written) of President Von der Leyen Towards 2030

Posted on by claudia

Alfredo De Feo, Scientific Director of the european college of Parma foundation

It is probably the first time since 1979 that the European press and media have dedicated so much space to Europe. After the initial controversies following the approval of the European Council’s proposed candidate, Ursula von der Leyen, by the new European Parliament with over 55% of the vote, a delicate phase has begun. This phase must lead to the definitive approval of the Commission that will guide the European process towards 2030. 

August, in particular, will be intense and challenging for the Commission President. President von der Leyen will need to balance the program she presented to the European Parliament, the competencies of the Commissioners, the parliamentary majority, the balance within the Council, and, importantly, gender parity. Only the right mix of these elements can ensure a smooth final passage before the European Parliament, leading to the Commission’s official start. 

The President of the Council will have to contend with the ambitions and demands of the twenty-seven governments, which include 13 center-right, 10 center-left, 2 right-wing, and transitional governments in France and Belgium.  

 Before voting to approve the Commission, the European Parliament will conduct hearings for each commissioner candidate through its respective parliamentary committees. In the past, the Parliament has rejected several commissioner candidates. The first instance was in 2004 when the Parliament rejected Rocco Buttiglione’s candidacy, forcing the Italian government to nominate Franco Frattini instead. Although not stipulated by the Treaties, this procedure has been respected by governments whose candidates have failed the parliamentary exam to avoid the risk of the entire Commission being rejected. 

To avoid this risk, governments must show flexibility by proposing competent candidates for the portfolios that President von der Leyen will assign to them. This step should not be underestimated. 

The Commissioners, along with the President, will shape the Commission’s policies. Among them will be Commissioners aligned with parties that voted against President von der Leyen. The real working program of the Commission will emerge from the balance formed within the Commission itself. In reality, President von der Leyen’s political agenda to guide Europe towards 2030 is still to be written. 

The candidate president’s programmatic speech to the European Parliament had political significance, especially regarding her personal commitment, but it does not constitute a work program. Once in office, the Commission will need to prepare proposals, considering the balance within the Commission, the significant parliamentary minority, and the positions of nine governments, five of which belong to the Conservative ECR group (Italy, Finland, Czech Republic, Sweden, and Belgium) and four to the Patriotic group. These parties range from Euro-opportunists to Euro-critics, Eurosceptics, or anti-Europeans. 

Beyond the program presented to the European Parliament, the task of the likely Commission President until 2029 will be much more complex. The proposals emerging from the College of Commissioners will face a legislative procedure that can only be concluded with a compromise between the two branches of the legislative power. The Commission must foster the best compromise while considering the trends from the European vote and the positions of a third of the states, knowing that unanimity is not always necessary within the Council. 

The real challenge for President von der Leyen will be to set a European policy that is more sustainable for European citizens and businesses. Only this political agenda can reduce the dissatisfaction that has largely fueled nationalist parties.  

Published in Gazzetta di Parma on August 5, 2024 

The Members of the EP at work

Posted on by claudia

Alfredo De Feo, Scientific Director of the European College of Parma Foundation

Now that the European citizens have elected the 720 Members of Parliament, how can the newly elected Members influence the decisions of the Parliament?  

First, they will discover that the so-called multilingualism, where everyone can speak their own language, is a chimera. Indeed, theoretically, speaking one’s own language is a right certainly guaranteed in plenary sessions but not sufficient to ensure good integration into the parliamentary work. The administration provides Members with interpreter and translation services; additionally, each Member can hire assistants to help them in communicating with their peers. However, if a Member cannot express themselves in one of the “vehicular” languages, or rather “in the vehicular language”, they risk being marginalized in the parliamentary work. 

The new Member will then discover that the organization of political work in the EP revolves around two pillars, two sides of the same coin: political groups and parliamentary committees.  

The parliamentary committees are divided by thematic areas, mirroring the committees of national parliaments. Members will be assigned to parliamentary committees based on their competencies and preferences. The composition of the committees will thus be proportional to the composition of the plenary assembly. Having specific expertise in a certain area will increase the possibility of influencing decisions. 

In the committees, besides the President and Vice Presidents, a central role is played by the spokespersons of the groups, one or two per group, who have the task of finding the most unified positions within the group and then defending the results achieved in the committee within their own political group. The groups’ spokespersons also decide the group responsible for each report or opinion and choose the rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs. Those positions are key to leave a mark on parliamentary work. 

For this reason, specific expertise in the European issues addressed by the parliamentary committee is essential to be able to aspire to hold one of the aforementioned roles and influence the decision-making process. Indeed, expertise counts; the impact of each Member will be proportional to their competence and way of interacting with their peers. 

Work in the committees is certainly fundamental, as the EP’s position on the legislation to be adopted is prepared in the committees, but it is not sufficient, as the plenary votes are determined by the positions of the political groups. 

To be influential, the Member must know how to find their points of reference within the group. Obviously, each group has its own organization, which generally includes a role for national delegations and some thematic areas, which generally cover the competencies of several parliamentary committees. Again, Members who want to assert national specificities must find the support of the political group, which will then have to negotiate compromises with other groups to achieve the required majority in the plenary. 

In conclusion, we hope that the new MEPs will rapidly adapt to the EP working method to value their expertise and to integrate well into the parliamentary committees and their respective political groups to actively participate in the democratic construction of Europe. 

Contact us for more information