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Category: Blog

The American Administration and European Sovereignty

Posted on by claudia

Alfredo De Feo

There are dates in history that have an impact on citizens and public opinion. For example, how can we forget March 2020, when almost simultaneously the world stopped due to a pandemic that reminded the whole world of the fragility of human beings especially in a globalized world; or February 22, 2022, when the aggression against Ukraine by Russia broke a balance of peace putting an end to some basic principles of international law such as respect for the sovereignty of a State with the concrete risk not only of extension of the conflict but also the risk of violations of national sovereignty, through military actions or sophisticated cyber interference. Or again October 7, 2023 when the brutal attacks by Hamas against the Israeli people reopened the never-ending Israel-Palestinian conflict, with its burden of massacres and tensions and the risk of destabilizing the entire region with human and economic consequences that are difficult to calculate.

 

January 20, 2025 could become a date that will be remembered in the history of European countries. The entrance into the White House of the newly re-elected President Trump risks in fact to the life of us Europeans. Obviously we do not know if and how the electoral proclamations will translate into concrete actions and policies, but even admitting that much evidence does not make proof, there are enough reasons to be concerned. I will limit myself to pointing out three concrete threats to which European countries must be ready to give effective responses.  These threats are: 1) the introduction of duties on European products, 2) global deregulation from the use/abuse of artificial intelligence, social media and customs clearance of cryptocurrencies and 3) the American military disengagement from Europe.

 

The issue of duties is what could tempt European states to go and negotiate bilaterally with the American administration. A separate negotiation of the individual states would allow them to extract some concessions but the price to pay would be high both in terms of imports and in increasing American influence on national policies in the various countries. European states should defend their sovereignty by trying to prepare a common response to American initiatives, trying to avoid a trade war, harmful for all, and trying to establish a negotiation to reach a global trade agreement, which can only be achieved with the ability to find objectives shared by all states.

In the technology sector, Europe has a large production delay but has been at the forefront in regulating the use of artificial intelligence (AI act) to allow responsible use for the benefit of consumers and for the defence of copyright. At the same time, measures have been adopted to regulate Digital services and the Digital Market. These measures are aimed at limiting the excessive power of digital platforms, such as Amazon, Facebook, TikTok, Google and others. To this must be added the probable pressure exerted by Trump’s powerful advisor, Elon Musk, to formalize and liberalize the market of cryptocurrencies (he is also the owner of one of these). European states have every interest in regulating the sectors of services and the digital market and cryptocurrencies, so as not to be caught unprepared and resist the probable deregulation pressures that will likely come from the new American administration. Only with a strong position will European states be able to protect their citizens and maintain their national sovereignty.

Finally, the problem of security and protection of the European territory from external attacks. The protection guaranteed so far by the American shield within NATO risks disappearing. The United States has long been asking for a greater financial commitment for defence within NATO, requests that have only found a distracted ear from most European governments. The new American administration risks not making any concessions and forcing European states to increase defence spending.

This poses three types of problems: financial, productive and military. The public finances of almost all states do not have, individually, the resources to sustain expenses, which would also raise strong criticism and resistance from public opinion. The solution could be found, on the model put in place in the post Covid period, in the issuance of common European debt to finance a greater European presence in its military defence.

The second problem is of a productive nature: if the European states do not want to continue financing the American arms industries, they must agree to direct production and towards a reduced number of weapon models, and renouncing their claim to national excellence. This is not easy but essential to invest in European industry as recommended in Enrico Letta’s report.

Finally, the military aspect: the simple coordination of initiatives is not enough. A qualitative leap is necessary, creating decision-making structures capable of taking measures to guarantee the security of our countries and the sovereignty of our States.

If Europe will positively take up the challenges that will come from the United States, the date of January 20, 2025 could be remembered as that of the qualitative leap of Europe, otherwise … better not think about it!  

English version edited by Edward Lynch

Published by the Gazzetta di Parma 11/01/2025

Towards the digital euro: what is it and what will it be used for?

Posted on by claudia

Marco Ziliotti

Imagine being able to have a virtual purse, embedded in your smartphone – or computer – or in a card, allowing you to make payments accepted anywhere, without commissions or other costs (neither for you nor for the recipient); which would work even offline, in the most remote mountain retreat or when the internet goes down; which would allow, again without cost, to transfer purchasing power in real time to a family member whose wallet has been stolen while travelling abroad; which, unlike credit transfers, credit and debit cards, is not only, as mentioned above, free of charge, but does not even require a bank account; which, however, if you already have one, can allow you (via a so-called reverse waterfall mechanism) to draw on your existing funds; in short, a means of payment as simple and universal as cash, but which, unlike cash, thanks to its immateriality, can be used without physical transfer and held minimising the risks of fraudulent misappropriation.

In fact, there have been digital wallet systems on the market for years (including the most popular apps PayPal, Google Pay, Apple Pay, Amazon Pay), but first of all, their functioning depends on internet coverage and, moreover, they are instruments managed by private entities, mainly from across the Atlantic, which, among other things, take possession of all the information relating to the transactions carried out.

The digital euro, on the other hand, in the same way as the physical euro, will be a means of payment managed by an authoritative public institution, the ECB, with all the necessary guarantees (including that of having a ‘domestic’ manager, a non-trivial element in times of great geopolitical uncertainty). The legislative project for the establishment of a European CBDC (Central Bank Digital Currency) – similar projects in the US and China are, moreover, at an advanced stage – is contained in the ‘Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the establishment of the digital euro’, which, after a preparatory phase that began in November 2023, envisages that in a year’s time the Governing Council of the ECB will move on to the operational phase, establishing the detailed methods and timing (rulebook).

The diffusion of the virtual European currency will therefore probably begin in 2026, with the obligation to accept it as a means of payment not only in the twenty countries of the Eurozone, but in all twenty-seven of the EU, with the well-founded expectation that in a short time, in the same way as the physical euro, the digital euro will also be accepted in all – or almost all – countries of the world.

The precise aim of the European authorities is that the digital euro should only be a means of payment and not a reserve of value (i.e. an asset in which to invest one’s wealth). To this end, it is envisaged that sums held in digital euros will not bear any interest and will be subject to strict quantitative limits at the individual level (businesses will only be able to receive it in payment). These constraints will also serve to avoid disintermediation effects and thus displacement of the banking system: bank deposits will continue to be the typical form of reserves of liquid assets.

This nature as a mere means of payment, and not as a potential speculative asset, also highlights how the digital euro is in no way comparable to cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin, Ethereum, Tether, Solana, etc.): these in fact, as is well known, have no guarantee of legal control, but rather systems based on distributed technologies, such as blockchain, and are typically used as forms of speculative investment, which are highly volatile.

The digital euro, on the other hand, will be subject to precise controls by the ECB, which, in accordance with its precise institutional mandate, will therefore have to guarantee its security – first and foremost against cybercrime -, the stability of its value and, no less important, the protection of privacy. The latter is a particularly sensitive issue: the frequent use of cryptocurrencies for illicit purposes suggests that digital currencies, like cash, may also be used for illegal purposes. It will be up to the intelligence of the regulator to find the right balance between fighting financial crime and economic freedom.

Translated with deepl edited by Edward Lynch

The future European Commission

Posted on by claudia

Alfredo De Feo

On 20 November 2024, the political groups in the European Parliament concluded a political agreement which, with reasonable certainty, will allow the new European Commission to take office, as last term,  on 1 December. This vote puts an end to many months in which the European institutions’ attitudes has looked more inward than geopolitical. The election of Trump to the Presidency of the United States has given an acceleration to processes that in the past have been more complex.

For many observers, the behaviour of the leaders of the parliamentary groups appeared to be immature, dictated by concerns that are difficult to understand in the face of global urgencies and challenges, challenges that can only be faced with great unity.

The contrasts between the political groups, beyond identity and national positions, concealed a basic malaise: accepting the shift of the majority from the Europeanism we have known in decades to positions of a Europeanism, marked by a more invasive presence of the States, This new tendency is probably more in tune with the sentiments of a part of public opinion,  which translated into the result in the European elections.

Ursula von der Leyen, immediately grasped this change, proposing to involve the conservative group, or at least part of the group, in the top positions of the Commission, being aware that in the next five years it will not always be able to count on the majority of the People’s Party, Socialists, Liberals and probably Greens but that, probably, she will also need the support of the more moderate right European conservatives. In addition, the appointment of a Vice-President of the Commission issue of the Conservatives should guarantee a more stable majority in the Council, where Italy’s weight is not indifferent. In fact, in the bicameral European architecture, the Commission, for any legislative act, will have to find the support not only of the parliamentary majority but also that of the Member States. The attitude of the President of the Commission denotes lucidity and political realism.

The European Parliament has largely demonstrated in recent years its central role in the institutional balance, it will be able to continue to be central provided that it maintains the ability to compromise even in the face of a Council, whose majority of States probably have a more national vision of Europe.

On the other hand, if we look at the last twenty years, the European decision-making process has become progressively more intergovernmental, reducing the influence of the Commission. The Commission that will have to accompany Europe towards 2030 will certainly be influenced by governments, many of the Commissioners are direct expressions of national governments and it is likely that these will condition the Commission’s choices more than in the past.

However, recent years have shown that the process of European integration can also continue through the intergovernmental method, with decisions taken unanimously, as for instance the Recovery and Resilience Plan financed with the guarantee of the national budgets. Although this type of funding is unlikely to be replicated in the short term, Member States may follow the same method to progress in the European integration. The concrete proof appeared at the informal European Council on 8 November 2024, where the Heads of State and Government invited the Commission to present a horizontal strategy on the deepening of the single market, towards a union of savings and investment and to make urgent progress on the capital markets union.

 

In addition, States ask to the High Representative and the Commission to present proposals to increase the efficiency of the European defence capability, in particular by appropriately strengthening the defence technological and industrial base.

To conclude, the new Commission will have to strengthen European credibility with proposals that can garner the consensus of all the States if possible, without forgetting that the Treaties provide that some projects can be shared only by a group of States, through the enhanced cooperation as for the Euro, or the Schengen Treaty, , obviously leaving the doors open to others to participate. 

 

Pubblicato sulla Gazzetta di Parma 23/11/2024

The Single Market and the English Lesson

Posted on by claudia

Alfredo De Feo, Scientific Director of the european college of Parma foundation

For more than four years the United Kingdom has formally left the European Union, and by now everyone recognises that the balance sheet of the divorce is heavily negative. According to figures presented by the UK Budget Office, none of the promises of the referendum promoters have been fulfilled: savings in contributions to the EU, less tax plus trade and fewer migrants. The UK continues to pay its debts to Europe (32 billion), has increased immigration from non-EU countries as a result of the departure of much European labour, putting essential services such as hospitals into crisis, trade with non-EU countries has not lived up to expectations, and the reintroduction of borders has led to the recruitment of a hundred thousand additional civil servants, which has increased public expenditure.

For example, from 2009 to 2016, Europe invested over €6 billion per year in the UK, between the European budget and the European Investment Bank, compared to the €2.4 billion made available by the government in recent years (EIB and UK budget office data, reported by Corriere della sera on 1 July). All this explains why the UK, and its citizens, have become impoverished in the last four years.

The British lesson should induce the European ruling class and public opinion to reflect on the benefits that the intuitions of Delors, Mitterand and Kohl to create the Single Market for people, goods, services and capital brought to Europe. A single market that has been imperfectly realised.

The European Parliament has published a mapping of the cost of non-Europe, i.e. the benefits that a completion of the European market would bring to the economies of member states. The study concludes that a deepening of European integration could increase European GDP by more than €2.8 trillion by 2032.

Awareness of this untapped potential led the European Council to request the preparation of a report on the future of the internal market, a report whose drafting was entrusted to Enrico Letta, former Italian Prime Minister and President of the Delors Institute and Rector of one of Europe’s most prestigious business schools in Madrid.

The report, Much more than a market, defines the context in which European leaders will have to confront themselves, identifying three key factors that must guide the deepening of the EU’s internal market: 1) the commitment to an ecological and digital transition that is economically and socially sustainable; 2) the inescapable prospect of European enlargement; and 3) the need to strengthen the coordination of EU defence policies, a policy that cannot be delegated to our NATO partners.

The Report, submitted to the European Council in April 2024, reviews the areas where the internal market needs to be completed or renewed in order to unleash new potential for the single market, presenting a series of concrete proposals ultimately aimed at improving the lives of citizens and economic operators.

These proposals include the extension of the single market to innovation, research and education, and the creation of a European company law, complementary to national laws with the aim of helping businesses, especially small and medium-sized ones, operating or wishing to exploit European markets.

Some of these proposals were taken up by the next President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leynen, in her investiture speech before the European Parliament and included in the mandate given to individual commissioners. It is therefore to be hoped that the proposals contained in the report will become part of the European political agenda in the coming months. 

In conclusion, the Letta report achieves two objectives: the first is to put the importance of the single market back on the table of European leaders and in front of public opinion, also on the strength of the negative British experience; the second is to contribute to the European political agenda of the coming months.

European policy also needs ambitious goals to regain the trust of public opinion, while being aware of a complex framework: a new Commission, a European Parliament strongly influenced by nationalist tendencies, and an international context dominated by crises that are difficult to solve, such as the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, the continuous migratory flows, but also climate change and the satisfaction of energy needs.

European public opinion needs to rediscover an ideal drive as Delors was able to do in the mid-1980s by launching the single market programme. Free movement in Europe is not just an economic factor but serves to revive and strengthen the sense of belonging of European citizens, as the title of the report says much more than a market, it represents an opportunity for European leaders, which we hope they will not miss.

Traduzione automatica rivista da Edward Lynch

Where does european economic integration stand?

Posted on by claudia

Marco Ziliotti, Administrative Director of the european college of Parma Foundation

For more than thirty years – more than a generation ago,  – in a prevailing area of the European continent, which has in the meantime expanded from twelve to twenty-seven states.

People (Schengen Treaty, 19 June 1990), financial capitals (EEC Directive of 1 July 1990) and goods (European Single Market, 1 January 1993) have circulated without borders. For more than twenty years, payments in twenty of these countries have been settled with a common currency, the Euro.

The economic, social, political and cultural effects of the European integration project (a unique experiment in history, because it was not imposed by a hegemonic state, but by the voluntary cooperation of all the member states) have been, and are, undeniably profound, pervasive and to a large extent irreversible. But the road ahead for Europe, if only from an economic point of view, to truly become a common home, capable of fully exploiting its extraordinary potential, is by no means finished.

As far as the movement of goods is concerned, despite the fact that the single market and the single currency have enormously strengthened the supply chains on a continental, to date the total value of intra-EU trade in goods accounts for little more than a quarter of the total value produced; on the other hand, this interchange is worth 60% among the United States of America,.

In Europe, language barriers, the heterogeneity of the legal value of educational and professional qualifications, and the lack of integration between different pension systems still represent serious obstacles to labour mobility. Although an increasing number of young people, choose to – or are forced to seek job opportunities abroad, on average only three out of every hundred Europeans live and work permanently in a Member State other than their country of birth; in the USA, one in four.

Integration with regard to trade in services is still largely unfinished: for instance, the telecommunication and energy sectors have remained, from the outset, outside the Single Market. Partly as a result of this (as strongly highlighted in Mario Draghi’s recent speech at La Hulpe), the failure of European utilities to exploit economies of scale and the poor interconnection between national networks make the bills of European businesses and households much higher than those of the United States, and not only there.

But the most striking example of potential European competitive advantages that remains unexploited due to persistent fragmentation of rules and institutions is the capital market. On the one hand, the historical capacity of private savings, of households in particular, which in Europe remains at a level more than double than that of American households (the saving rates on disposable income in the EU varies between the member states from 10 to 15 per cent; in the United States, recent historical series show it at between 3 and 5 per cent – except for the peak of ‘forced savings’ during the pandemic). Yet 250 billion euros of financial flows leave Europe every year.

The capitalisation of European stock exchanges remains a sub-multiple not only of the American ones (Nyse and Nasdaq), but also of the Asian ones (Tokyo, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Singapore). The reason is obvious: when an Italian company is listed in Milan, it is in fact accessing predominantly domestic savings (stock market capitalisation of the Piazza Affari stock exchange: 800 billion euros; stock market capitalisation – ‘market cap’ – of the Nyse on Wall Street: 25 billion dollars, of which almost one third are non-American companies).

Once again, the key word in the problem is integration: it is very true that a German saver can buy shares in Italy and vice versa, but this remains a ‘foreign investment’. The Italian and German capital markets are controlled by different supervisory authorities (Consob and BaFin; the European authority ESMA has only coordinating powers); the rules governing the operation of German and Italian companies (company law; crisis and insolvency codes) remain distinct; just as the taxation on business income produced in Italy or Germany, or any other European state, is different, with a variability across Europe – from 9% in Hungary and 12% in Ireland, to 35% in Malta – that is unparalleled among the various US states (with a minimum tax rate of 21% and a maximum of 30%).

Despite the extraordinary progress made, given its democratic rules of governance, Europe is still in limbo. In today’s competitive and geopolitical environment, returning to its original values would be disastrous for its individual member states. All that remains is to move forward, with the utmost determination and with the awareness that the “particular” disadvantages of integration are far outweighed by the advantages of general interest.    

Which majority to appoint the President of the European Council?

Posted on by claudia

José Luis Pacheco 

It may not be very important, but it is telling about the lack of knowledge of European affairs by the media sphere (and consequently public opinion). 

 Many papers, including some commonly considered as a reference have noticed that the election of the President of the European Council is made by this body deciding by qualified majority. The same applies to the nomination of the candidate for President of the Commission and with the election of the High Representative Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.   So far so good. But then they add that this means the favorable vote of 55% of the member states, corresponding at least to 65% of the population of the Union. This amounts to 15 Member States (without taking into consideration the population factor). 

It is wrong!  

That is the qualified majority required when the Council or the European Council decide on the basis of a proposal from the Commission. But in this case there is no proposal from the Commission. It is member states themselves who propose names to the nominations. In such cases, when the decision is not taken on the basis of a proposal from the Commission, the qualified majority requires the favorable vote of 72% of the member states, representing at least 65% of the population of the Union. This means 20 member states (quite a difference as compared to 15). It results from art. 15(6) TUE and from article 235(1) TFEU, which calls for the application of art. 16(4) TUE and 238(2) TFEU to the decision-making procedure in the European Council. 

It is bad enough when such mistakes can be read in prestigious papers. But it is much worse when the error can be found on the site of the European Commission itself, which serves as guide for most of the press and for citizens.

The Political Agenda (Yet to Be Written) of President Von der Leyen Towards 2030

Posted on by claudia

Alfredo De Feo, Scientific Director of the european college of Parma foundation

It is probably the first time since 1979 that the European press and media have dedicated so much space to Europe. After the initial controversies following the approval of the European Council’s proposed candidate, Ursula von der Leyen, by the new European Parliament with over 55% of the vote, a delicate phase has begun. This phase must lead to the definitive approval of the Commission that will guide the European process towards 2030. 

August, in particular, will be intense and challenging for the Commission President. President von der Leyen will need to balance the program she presented to the European Parliament, the competencies of the Commissioners, the parliamentary majority, the balance within the Council, and, importantly, gender parity. Only the right mix of these elements can ensure a smooth final passage before the European Parliament, leading to the Commission’s official start. 

The President of the Council will have to contend with the ambitions and demands of the twenty-seven governments, which include 13 center-right, 10 center-left, 2 right-wing, and transitional governments in France and Belgium.  

 Before voting to approve the Commission, the European Parliament will conduct hearings for each commissioner candidate through its respective parliamentary committees. In the past, the Parliament has rejected several commissioner candidates. The first instance was in 2004 when the Parliament rejected Rocco Buttiglione’s candidacy, forcing the Italian government to nominate Franco Frattini instead. Although not stipulated by the Treaties, this procedure has been respected by governments whose candidates have failed the parliamentary exam to avoid the risk of the entire Commission being rejected. 

To avoid this risk, governments must show flexibility by proposing competent candidates for the portfolios that President von der Leyen will assign to them. This step should not be underestimated. 

The Commissioners, along with the President, will shape the Commission’s policies. Among them will be Commissioners aligned with parties that voted against President von der Leyen. The real working program of the Commission will emerge from the balance formed within the Commission itself. In reality, President von der Leyen’s political agenda to guide Europe towards 2030 is still to be written. 

The candidate president’s programmatic speech to the European Parliament had political significance, especially regarding her personal commitment, but it does not constitute a work program. Once in office, the Commission will need to prepare proposals, considering the balance within the Commission, the significant parliamentary minority, and the positions of nine governments, five of which belong to the Conservative ECR group (Italy, Finland, Czech Republic, Sweden, and Belgium) and four to the Patriotic group. These parties range from Euro-opportunists to Euro-critics, Eurosceptics, or anti-Europeans. 

Beyond the program presented to the European Parliament, the task of the likely Commission President until 2029 will be much more complex. The proposals emerging from the College of Commissioners will face a legislative procedure that can only be concluded with a compromise between the two branches of the legislative power. The Commission must foster the best compromise while considering the trends from the European vote and the positions of a third of the states, knowing that unanimity is not always necessary within the Council. 

The real challenge for President von der Leyen will be to set a European policy that is more sustainable for European citizens and businesses. Only this political agenda can reduce the dissatisfaction that has largely fueled nationalist parties.  

Published in Gazzetta di Parma on August 5, 2024 

The Members of the EP at work

Posted on by claudia

Alfredo De Feo, Scientific Director of the European College of Parma Foundation

Now that the European citizens have elected the 720 Members of Parliament, how can the newly elected Members influence the decisions of the Parliament?  

First, they will discover that the so-called multilingualism, where everyone can speak their own language, is a chimera. Indeed, theoretically, speaking one’s own language is a right certainly guaranteed in plenary sessions but not sufficient to ensure good integration into the parliamentary work. The administration provides Members with interpreter and translation services; additionally, each Member can hire assistants to help them in communicating with their peers. However, if a Member cannot express themselves in one of the “vehicular” languages, or rather “in the vehicular language”, they risk being marginalized in the parliamentary work. 

The new Member will then discover that the organization of political work in the EP revolves around two pillars, two sides of the same coin: political groups and parliamentary committees.  

The parliamentary committees are divided by thematic areas, mirroring the committees of national parliaments. Members will be assigned to parliamentary committees based on their competencies and preferences. The composition of the committees will thus be proportional to the composition of the plenary assembly. Having specific expertise in a certain area will increase the possibility of influencing decisions. 

In the committees, besides the President and Vice Presidents, a central role is played by the spokespersons of the groups, one or two per group, who have the task of finding the most unified positions within the group and then defending the results achieved in the committee within their own political group. The groups’ spokespersons also decide the group responsible for each report or opinion and choose the rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs. Those positions are key to leave a mark on parliamentary work. 

For this reason, specific expertise in the European issues addressed by the parliamentary committee is essential to be able to aspire to hold one of the aforementioned roles and influence the decision-making process. Indeed, expertise counts; the impact of each Member will be proportional to their competence and way of interacting with their peers. 

Work in the committees is certainly fundamental, as the EP’s position on the legislation to be adopted is prepared in the committees, but it is not sufficient, as the plenary votes are determined by the positions of the political groups. 

To be influential, the Member must know how to find their points of reference within the group. Obviously, each group has its own organization, which generally includes a role for national delegations and some thematic areas, which generally cover the competencies of several parliamentary committees. Again, Members who want to assert national specificities must find the support of the political group, which will then have to negotiate compromises with other groups to achieve the required majority in the plenary. 

In conclusion, we hope that the new MEPs will rapidly adapt to the EP working method to value their expertise and to integrate well into the parliamentary committees and their respective political groups to actively participate in the democratic construction of Europe. 

European elections and the appointment of the President of the Commission

Posted on by collegio

Alfredo De Feo, Scientific Director of the european college of Parma foundation 

One of the central issues of the upcoming European elections is the appointment of the next President of the Commission. The candidate proposed by the European Council, taking into account the results of the elections, should be appointed by the European Parliament.

Since 2014, to reinforce the link between candidates and elections, the European parties have been appointing their candidates for the Presidency of the Commission (lead candidates). The candidates have then presented their vision of Europe and their responses to transnational challenges.

These debates are certainly interesting, as they force the candidates to present their ideas and their recipes, but they still have a great limitation: they do not attract the attention of public opinion in the various countries. Firstly, there is a language barrier, which is difficult to overcome, and secondly, the leaders of national parties have little motivation, especially when they are candidates, to put forward the candidate of the European party to which they are affiliated.

The European Parliament had put forward a proposal, supported by the most federalist circles, to create a single transnational constituency where each European party would present a single list with its own single candidate. In this way, the leading candidate of the party with the most votes would have a popular investiture, a kind of European premiership.

In reality, there is another limitation, the absence of a single electoral system, each country organizes its elections internally as it sees fit. In addition, proportional voting certainly makes the European Parliament representative of national public opinion, and this is a good thing, but not necessarily suitable for electing the best candidate for President of the Commission, whose main quality should be his/her capacity of mediator between the ‘Senate’ (national governments) and the lower house (the European Parliament).

The future President of the Commission must, however, have the ability to coalesce a parliamentary majority, probably making concessions to the right and the left, only in this way he/she will be able to have a majority in the European Parliament, a majority that could lose during the term of office, in case the motion of censure is activated, as it happened, in 1999 with the Santer Commission.

The best example of the Commission President’s ability to compromise came in 2019. Ursula von der Leyen was not among the Leader candidates expressed by the European parties, but none of them had the necessary parliamentary majority to be elected. The European Council nominated Ms von der Leyen, who was confirmed by only nine votes. After that, she negotiated her government programme with the parliamentary groups after the elections, obtaining a solid parliamentary majority.

To conclude, as it is often the case in Europe, the ideal solution is not achievable and remains a goal, but there is (almost) always a sub-optimal solution that advances the democratic process and European integration.

In previous years, the President of the Commission was formally appointed by the European Council. In practice, the appointment took place in a private room of the Council, or more often in a small room in some hotel between two or maximum three Heads of State, you can guess the names! The Treaty of Lisbon put an end to this practice and the European Parliament, with the majority that will emerge from the ballot box, has a decisive role. The citizens’ vote will have an important influence on the future of Europe.

EU Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy with a focus on the Western Balkan countries

Posted on by collegio

Dejan Kralov, DAES alumni

The topic of the European Union enlargement is one of the most relevant and significant issues facing the Union, particularly in times of war and destabilization in Europe mainly caused by the Russian aggression against Ukraine. The EU’s enlargement and neighborhood policy play a crucial role in shaping the future stability, prosperity, security and progress of both the European Union and the entire European continent. By expanding the zone of peace and development, the European Union extends its presence and influence, striving to become the most influential global power. However, the thesis elaborates how the requirement for unanimous decisions within the EU poses one of the main obstacles for achieving the above-mentioned future challenges. Additionally, the thesis advocates for introduction of clear reasons due to which a certain EU candidate country can be vetoed in order to establish a more democratic, effective and efficient membership process without blackmails, within a strengthened and united EU accessible equally to all European countries. It is a fact that we have witnessed quite unprincipled blockades without competent, democratic and legitimate reasons for veto by compromising the Copenhagen criteria and EU treaties, while interfering in the candidate countries’ sovereignty, which is uncharacteristic for the European Union. Moreover, the thesis focuses on the Copenhagen criteria, essential benchmarks that must be met by candidate countries to progress in the accession process. They indicate if the candidate countries are politically, economically, and legally prepared in the accession process, while emphasizing that bilateral issues must not be a reason for veto according to EU treaties. However, this is not the case in reality, where such bilateral issues often take precedence. Such inappropriate vetoes, as the current Bulgarian veto of Macedonia and Greek veto of Albania, as well as the previous Greek veto of Macedonia marked by blackmails and a misuse of stronger and more assertive position as EU member states, while compromising the principles of the European Union and its treaties.

The thesis focuses on the history of every Western Balkan candidate country’s path to EU accession. It highlights all main disputes, agreements and statements, while providing potential solutions for resolving the actual disputes. Supported by facts and arguments, Macedonia’s path to EU accession represents the most difficult, undemocratic and unique accession process that must not happen to any EU candidate country. At the same time, the EU accession process of Macedonia is an example of how the accession to the European Union should not look like. With such types of vetoes like the Greek and Bulgarian ones towards Macedonia, the European Union is violating its values without which it cannot survive as a community. The Greek veto, which pertained to the non-recognition of the Macedonian national and constitutional flag and also the name “Republic of Macedonia”, contradicted the conclusion provided by the European Union Arbitration Commission, that the name “Macedonia” does not represent any territorial threat for Greece. At the same time, Greece also violated international law by not respecting the “Interim Agreement” signed between these two countries. In addition, Greece does not respect the judgment of the International Court of Justice related to this case, where 15 votes were in favour of Macedonia and only one vote from the Greek judge in favour of Greece. Furthermore, Greece acted contrary to the stances of all European institutions, all the positive reports provided by the European Commission and against the resolution from the European Parliament in 2010, which emphasized that the Copenhagen criteria were fully satisfied by Macedonia for the start of accession negotiations. Despite the EU’s promise to Macedonia that this would be the final obstacle before EU membership, the current Bulgarian veto has proven otherwise. This veto was imposed in pretty much the same way by compromising the Copenhagen criteria, EU treaties, regulations and obviously blackmailing Macedonia once again only for self-interests and benefits because of the better assertive position as an EU member state, not thinking about the common interest, stability and future prosperity of the European Union. Additionally, such actions violate the fundamental European values and this interference in the candidate country’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and citizens’ nationality is contrary to international law and EU Treaties.

If the EU intends to complete the ongoing process of joining the European Convention on Human Rights and recognise the jurisdiction of Strasbourg, then should decide whether Macedonia is the guilty party and should really be vetoed due to unsubstantiated and alleged claims about disrespect for human rights, although there are no such judgments and it is an example of a multi-ethnic state where all the rights of minorities are fully protected, or Bulgaria may be the true party at fault, using the veto as a cover-up for its own actions or responsibilities. The fact that Bulgaria has 14 judgments from the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg related to the non-recognition and violation of the human rights of the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria, that have not yet been implemented is the strongest proof of this case. However, we need to delve deeper into this process to find out the real reasons behind this veto. According to the number of judgements from the Court of Human Rights for these two countries, one thing becomes evident, the Bulgarian demand for the inclusion of the Bulgarian minority (less than 1% of the total population in Macedonia) in the Macedonian constitution serves as a mask behind which the real underlying demands lie. Behind this condition lie numerous others, primarily concerning historical issues, as articulated by several prominent Bulgarian politicians, including the current President Rumen Radev and Bulgarian MEP Angel Dzambaski, who have even expressed territorial pretentions towards Macedonia. The political pressure should be directed towards Sofia instead of unilaterally towards Skopje, mainly due to the facts that Bulgaria has faced criticism from the European Court of Human Rights, the Council of Europe and the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination for its failure to implement the judgements concerning the human rights of the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria. The need for strict involvement in this process by the EU is necessary, otherwise the union itself will break its own values because after all Bulgaria is part of the EU. Nevertheless, while Macedonia has been better prepared for the start of accession negotiations in specific previous years, these were the primary reasons driving the accession process and bilateral disputes together with many blackmails took precedence.

I have presented four potential solutions for resolving the current dispute between Bulgaria and Macedonia. The first solution implies signing of a resolution that will contain the inclusion of the Bulgarian minority in the Macedonian constitution, as well as the implementation of the judgments from the Court of Human Rights which will follow immediately after the ratification of the Accession Treaty, following the example of the resolution between Croatia and Slovenia related to their territorial dispute. The second potential solution is a provision of written guarantees by the EU that will not follow additional future demands from Bulgaria. The third solution, includes extreme measures such as suspending European grants to Bulgaria, which are vital for its functioning. My last but not least solution aims to prevent the exploitation of the EU by Bulgaria in future and to protect the security, dignity and democratic principles of the EU, which means acting with four-fifths of EU members, to suspend and relativise the decision-making rights of Bulgaria as seen in procedures initiated for Hungary and Poland, deciding that by violating the fundamental values, Bulgaria creates risks in EU foreign policy, because after all the right of veto is not an absolute right.

In order the process of EU enlargement be successful, the political doublespeak must stop, either in the EU and Western Balkan countries. The EU must stop its doublespeak for so many years that is open for enlargement and war had to happen to understand how important the enlargement is for the EU’s future. The EU enlargement and neighborhood policy must become a priority again because only with a completed and unified EU could become the most powerful global factor. On the other side, Western Balkan countries must stop with doublespeak about their readiness for the needed reforms because we are witnessing numerous low evaluations in the European Commission reports, and their challenges remain the same for so many years such as the rule of law, fight against crime and corruption, as well as independent judiciary. If the EU wants to achieve future security, stability and prosperity as well as complete removal of Russian influence and presence in these areas that significantly contribute to destabilisation, a sincere and concrete offer specifying a precise date for accession to the EU need to be offered alongside clearly defined democratic conditions for enlargement. Additionally, gradually inclusion of the Western Balkan countries into the European single market and Schengen zone before their full membership, giving them an equal opportunity to progress as all the EU member states.

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